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The “Chinese scenario” is based on Resolution 2758 of October 25, 1971, of the UN General Assembly, when the UN seat was transferred from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China. This scenario enables decision-making without involving the Security Council and, accordingly, does not require overriding the veto power in the Security Council. Moreover, according to this scenario and the Belovezha Accords, Ukraine, as a state of the former USSR, has every right to occupy the permanent seat of the USSR in the UN Security Council (pending a decision on what to do with the USSR’s seat in the UN). It is also important to take into account that the decision of the General Assembly is made by a simple majority (votes of abstaining countries are not taken into account), that means that we do not need to ensure that two-thirds of the countries are in favor.

The replacement of Russia from the UN (due to the existing Chinese precedent) does not imply a revision of resolutions adopted by Russia since 1991. And there is also no problem that the P5 can de facto turn into P4. Since, according to the same Chinese precedent, from 1961 to 1971, there were also de facto four members.


The example of Czechoslovakia is very revealing and reflects the legal path that Russia should have been obliged to follow after the disappearance of the USSR.

Czechoslovakia was one of the original members of the United Nations on October 24, 1945.

In a letter dated December 10, 1992, its Permanent Representative informed the UN Secretary-General that the Czechoslovak Federal Republic was dissolving on December 31, 1992, and that the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic were submitting new applications for admission to the UN as independent legal successors.

After receiving such statements, the Security Council, on January 8, 1993, recommended the UN General Assembly accepts the Czech Republic as a member of the Organization.

Thus, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were accepted as members of the UN on January 19, 1993 (resolution 47/221 and resolution 47/222).

South Africa

The “South African scenario” is based on the work of the Credentials Committee and their responsibility to verify the credentials of all national delegations before the start of a session at the UN. Russia’s powers cannot be confirmed on Russia’s part by anything other than the habit of occupying the appropriate chair, since the Russian delegation is simply not able to provide decisions on membership. This scenario is based on the suspension of the South African delegation during apartheid on 12 November 1974. At the 29th Session of the General Assembly, the Credentials Committee decided by 5 votes to 3, with one abstention, to reject the credentials of the South African delegation on the grounds of multiple violations of the UN Charter.

On 30 September 1974, the Assembly adopted the Committee’s report by 93 votes to 23, with 14 abstentions. At the same meeting, the General Assembly, by a vote of 125 to 1, with 9 abstentions, adopted Resolution 3207 (XXIX), calling on the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa in light of that Member State’s persistent violation of the principles of the UN Charter.

According to Article 27(2) of the UN Charter, verification of credentials is a procedural matter and is not subject to the veto power of the Security Council.

Considering that Russia has never even ratified the UN Charter and there is no way it can block the adoption of this decision, this is an ideal scenario for us.